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Abstract. For a long time there has been an attempt to explain the current crisis in the fisheries sector in terms of a 
confrontation between those defending “fish” and those defending “fishermen”. However, the real problem concerns the 
governance of fisheries and how common resources are assigned; it is not just a crisis of resources per se. Therefore, 
an insightful understanding of the scenario leading to a satisfactory solution is more complex than it is often believed 
since there is a need to tackle problems related to the state of stocks, fishermen’s strategies and ecosystems. The 
fishing sector is not exclusively concerned with production activities as some analysts would have us believe. Rather, it 
is an area that integrates a number of important features and requires different approaches dealing with the industrial 
aspects of the sector, distribution and consumption. The fishing sector is characterised by a high level of public 
intervention, in terms of regulation, finance and state subsidies. The plethora of norms has become such that, currently, 
the main areas of debate are those concerning how best to preserve resources and ecosystems (by  managing and 
sustaining certain economic levels for example), the welfare of those who make their living from fishing, and the social 
impact on coastal communities among others. The main focus of debate used to be the conditions of access to fishing 
and fisheries. Nowadays, however, since early 2000s, efforts have concentrated on the limits of biological safety in 
order to guarantee sustainable and efficient fishing.This work carries out a dual analysis of the objectives of fisheries 
management. The first focuses on path dependence and the second on a debate among the three main players and 
their changing views. This approach allows us to clarify the different interests as regards policy-making, as well as to 
clearly define the different management implementation. 
 







Anthony Charles (1992) suggested that the analysis of fisheries management should be a 
mutual commitment on the part of the three main players to harmonize their conflicting points of 
view. He called these perspectives the conservation, rationalization and socio-community 
paradigms. Each of these holds certain objectives to be more important than others when it 
comes to fisheries management and regulation and each prioritizes certain kinds of instruments 
in benefit of a particular socio-economic group. The terms of the commitment may be either 
more or less near each of the triangles of the paradigms. 
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In light of the History of the Common Fishing Policy (CFP), many variables of the said 
paradigms are seemingly incompatible (Holden, 1994, Symes, 1997, 2007, Lequesne, 2001, 
Griève, 2001, González-Laxe, 2002, Gray & Hatchard, 2003).  
This disagreement has become so profound that the conservation measures recommended 
by experts and the decisions taken by policy-makers are blatantly at odds. Also, thanks to this 
disagreement, the failure of attempts to palliate the effects of more intensive fishing by 
rebuilding fishing stocks is also evident. In addition, the impact wrought by the use of 
instruments - clearly counter-productive in an economic and biological sense - is both patent 
and verifiable.  
At present, after the passing of the 2013 reforms, it becomes highly pertinent to refocus upon 
the idea of path-dependence. Further, on revisiting the thesis put forward by Charles (Boncoeur 
& Mesnil, 1999) and his proposed paradigm, it becomes possible to demonstrate that there is a 
new “triangulation of conflicts and decisions”.  
These will be classified using different perspectives. The most important may be stated thus: 
Is fishing policy en European policy or just the result of a set of common rules for certain 
aspects of fishing policy? Is the combined set of principles of subsidiarity and relative stability 
well defined? Are the governments of each member state the main interlocutors of their 
fishermen? Or, in contrast, are the economic agents the interlocutors of the Commission? 
These ideas lead to a new analysis, one which highlights the novel power relationships among 
the actors, the tensions and pressures upon the agents, and the preferences of both with 
respect to how to define the bases and principles of fisheries management and regulation. 
It is evident that with an analysis dealing with how the CFP works and its current status, it 
will be impossible to reach either a methodological consensus or a universally acceptable 
solution. Despite the principles of rigour and coherence adopted by different researchers, it is 
clear that there is a “methodological pluralism” which adapts itself to new and successive 
methods of analysis. 
Our study does not involve highlighting clashing methodological approaches, but instead it 
attempts to utilize methods that explain the current status of agents and how these behave. 
That is, this analysis is based upon a constructivist paradigm, with an objective review of the 
situation, combined with a critical evaluation. By so doing, problems become conceptualized 
within the dynamic of social patterns that underpin the current dynamic. In short, each actor is 
subjective as regards perceptions and proposals. 
Contributions to fisheries analysis from anthropology and sociology are more and more 
usual. These contributions provide a wide view about both the establishment and the 
explanation of stable collaborative relationships. They avoid short-term particularism by trying to 
integrate local habits of population as the essential tool to manage and protect fisheries, mostly 
traditional and artisanal fisheries (Berkes, 2012).    
There are, therefore, a wide range of objectives linked to certain public policies. As a 
consequence, it becomes necessary to apply techniques for multi-objective programming. This 
is far from easy, given the qualitative heterogeneity of fisheries management. That is why the 
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study deals with concepts that may be deemed to be satisfactory or acceptable, in other words 
pre-established objective or limit variables. Logically, the optimization involves minimizing the 
weighted sum of the deviations with respect to these objective variables. 
By examining the resolutions passed by the European parliament, we can see that the main 
objectives of fisheries management in the eyes of public administrations focus on the 
conservation of commercial stocks, the minimization of conflicts among fishermen and safety on 
board. The remaining objectives are considered to be less important. For producers, the two 
main objectives are the conservation of commercial stocks and profitability. For the scientific 
community the objectives focus upon the conservation of stocks and the minimization of 
negative impacts on ecosystems; and, for some producers organizations the objective is the 
implementation of protected maritime areas to be complementary with fisheries management 
measures.  
Does the CFP have the power to incorporate each group’s preferences? The short answer is 
no, although the final result is the sum of small alternatives with diverse periods of transition 
together with binary rather than total agreements. In short, this means that the views of each 
group are highly differentiated.  
 
Figure 1. Fishery management objectives. Source: own elaboration. 
 
In short, Anthony Charles’ paradigm, which highlighted conservation (linked to scientists), 
rationalization (to producers), and the socio-community paradigm (to institutions), has slightly 
changed. Nowadays, the relative stances of each agent are more clearly influenced by a 
worldwide vision rather than a trenchant defence of each group’s specific interests. 
In this line, it is pertinent to site four salient elements, the so-called “Big Problems” within the 
field of fisheries management. By common consent these four axes are as follows: a) 
sustainability; b) criteria about Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) and its implementation; c) the 
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First and foremost, it is important to highlight the fact that fishing sustainability cannot be 
gauged or analyzed in absolute terms (Daw & Gray, 2005). Lessons from previous mistakes 
should be learnt and assimilated and, by so doing, resources should be managed in a healthier 
and more ecologically way. Sustainable development is the final objective of any policy, so we 
should be prepared to rectify mistakes rapidly once the relationships between mankind and 
nature begin to collapse. Therefore, key decisions should not be burdened by an increase in red 
tape or driven by the desires of a single lobby, either multinationals or coastal communities. 
Sustainability depends more on the correct choice of a viable underlying policy, the levels of 
democracy of policy-makers, and on how to apply models to monitor resources. Hence, it 
should not be forgotten that the political processes to best control natural resources depend 
upon those communities that live on fishing and that decision making in the heart of the fishing 
community should be as participative, open and democratic as possible. 
The second consideration refers to criteria establishing Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). 
The European Commission is backing both the absolute concept of sustainability and the fixing 
of an MSY for a specific date (2015). For some scientists, this is not a viable strategy (Mace, 
2001; Mesnil, 2012). History records that, on occasions, it has taken a long time to restore 
overexploited stocks; or that the exact MSY is not known for all stocks or for specific species. 
Also, the wide annual variation in stocks and the complex interrelations among the different 
species make it very difficult to achieve the MSY in 2015 (Froese & Proelss, 2010). In short, 
there are many factors that affect the fishing mortality. These include pollution, climate change, 
and mistakes in scientific and fisheries management. All these factors, among others, make it 
problematical to reach the objective. 
The third bone of contention lies on the implementation of fishing quotas, the application of 
individual quotas of transferable fishing (ITQs), and the privatization of resources. The 
European Commission is fighting to achieve the illusive MSY as fast as possible, essentially 
basing its approach upon adjustments in the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and the quotas of 
transferable fishing. This approach is by no means the only solution and falls short of 
guaranteeing a healthy outcome for its components and actors. It might be the appropriate 
measure for certain highly specific stocks and well-known stocks which have been evaluated for 
decades in certain areas. In contrast, this is probably not the optimum solution for multi-specific 
fisheries; perhaps an attempt to limit efforts and a variety of selective controls might allow for 
greater flexibility when it comes to fishing ordination and, by extension better results. A second 
line of criticism attempts to show that when the TAC system and quotas come into force, this will 
irreversibly lead to privatization and an increase in catch-costs that encourage overfishing. If this 
were true, the leverage of financial institutions with respect to fishing would be reinforced; 
capital would become more concentrated, the number of fishing vessels would decrease, and 
the cost of market entry for new fishing vessels would rise. As a direct consequence, more 
expensive quotas would lead to more intensive fishing. In short, we might be on the eve of a 
great transformation in fishing and fisheries brought about by the imposition of quotas. This 
would accelerate the ascendency of financial criteria which would weaken the sustainability of 
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fishing systems and place the whole idea of sustainable fishing at risk. 
The fourth and final key factor to be taken into consideration is overfishing. According to 
European reports, the countries that make up the EC hold overfishing to be the prime cause of 
the crisis. As a consequence, the revealed aim of CFP reforms, right from the outset, has been 
to eliminate between two thirds and one half of fishermen and vessels in order to rapidly 
achieve the MSY. The coming into force of systems such as the TAC and fishing quotas will 
allow this to be carried out much faster whilst incurring minimal costs.  
The possible sale or leasing of quotas by artisanal fishing to the large groups would allow the 
financial sector to eliminate artisans without the need for public aid. The free concession of 
quotas would make operations profitable for financial groups and, by so doing, guaranteeing 
good profits.  
Similarly, all of the actions carried out, including modernization, adaptation, construction and 
the formalization of joint-ventures, etc. have been developed with the help of state aid and, 
without exception, there has been no connection with managerial measures. Hence, on certain 
occasions, there has been an increase in fishing potential but only at the expense of an 
excessive pressure upon resources.  
As a consequence, “preservation” is now the key-word, when it is necessary to apply severe 
and urgent measures.  In order to understand the triangulation of positions in the CFP debate, it 
is evident that these elements must be given serious consideration. Other specialists argue that 
it is impossible to apply administrative measures without taking into consideration the markets. It 
should also be highlighted that, under the banner of trade liberalization, there are no 
foreseeable safeguards for the protection of local production. In the same line, it becomes hard 
to mobilize producers against contingency measures, price falls or the introduction of eco-labels 
for certain species.  
 
 
2. The concept of path - dependence 
 
The concept of path-dependence is prevalent in the social sciences; recently it has become the 
focus of analyses in the fields of Law and Economics. The concept itself seeks to answer a 
series of questions. Why to change the current scenario proving to be so difficult? Why are 
certain social processes held back by inertia rather than moving towards change? And, finally, 
why is it impossible to replace some institutions? Without a doubt, the answers to these 
quandaries are complex since they must include dynamic and multidisciplinary elements which 
must be analyzed from different levels. 
Normally, the evolution of economic systems is carried out by using 
developmental/evolutionist theories, and focusing on the reach of the impact of the adopted 
measures. In this sense, when Dosi & Nelson (1994) explain the bases of evolutionary theory in 
economics they cite two characteristics. The first is an explanation of movement or change over 
time or an explanation of why certain things are as they are at a given time while emphasising 
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the causes that have led them to that juncture (the dynamic proposal). The second involves 
giving opportune explanations in order to contextualize both random elements (which allow us 
to distinguish what is being generated and renewed) and those that explain any substantial 
variation.  
Path-dependence is based on the idea of a dependent trajectory, which is both inherent and 
key to diffusion processes. This explains why path-dependence has had little traction in 
economics. David (1998) believed that path-dependence was the property of a contingent 
irreversible dynamic process, which includes a wide set of social and biological processes which 
might be accurately described as evolutionary. That is, “history matters” and “observable results 
are a function of history itself”. The same author elucidates by stating that path-dependence is 
made up of “a dynamic property related to the idea of a history composed of divisible, 
irreversible processes”. As a consequence, certain historical phases can generate inefficient 
situations which, on occasion, can be foreseen. Hence, path-dependence includes historical 
factors and biological and economic analyses, which are, in turn, broadened by neoclassical 
analyses.   
Path-dependence can be defined as a theory that states that “the present is the result of 
choices made in the past”. Therefore, in essence path-dependence is a form of analysis that 
attempts to discover the remote, historical causes of the social structures and processes of the 
present.  This theory substitutes the evolutionist hypothesis based upon the idea that it is 
possible to explain movements over the long term or how and why certain factors change, and 
what the causes of these changes are. In this sense, the theory of path-dependence seeks to 
explain factors such as how to interpret the fact that certain contingent events are capable of 
producing far reaching social results; or how these social results are capable of replicating 
themselves without the existence of the original forces that brought them to life; or finally, the 
characteristics of those reproduction processes that prevent or impede change. 
The bases of path-dependence include what are known as self-reinforcing sequences which 
underline the long-term formation and reproduction of an institutional model; that is, a standard 
which, over time, becomes more difficult to change or substitute for other more readily available 
options. This facet of path-dependence means that it is ever more difficult to change the initial 
state given the undeniable supremacy of the original factors. Path-dependence therefore, is 
made up of reactive sequences which are chains of events, chronologically ordered and 
connected causally. Each event within a sequence is a reaction to an event which occurred 
previously. This type of sequence is important when it comes to explaining the final results 
because a small change in one of the events is capable of generating considerable differences 
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3. Path-Dependence and common fishing policy 
 
Common Fishing Policy is a rule; it is the product of a decision. A different option might have 
been chosen. However, CFP, as an approved judicial rule, is gradually becoming a contingent 
event; that is, a point of confluence from which the institutional standard is reproduced. This has 
nothing to do with the fact that the political powers or actors have changed over time. It is 
evident that from the origins of the CFP agents have changed together with society and its 
interests. Nevertheless, the rule has remained unbending and, more surprisingly, it will be 
unlikely to change.  
On analyzing the causes of this phenomenon we find that the analytical structure of path-
dependence includes the following six factors: 
 
a) The starting point is a balanced situation. That is, ad initio there is a wide 
number of viable alternatives from which to develop the policy in question, or for the 
development of the institutions being examined. 
b) Different random events might exercise a substantial function upon the 
establishment of a given policy or upon a specific institutional type. 
c) The conditions via which the systems of path-dependence reproduce their 
forms or condition their sequences must be specified. 
d) Policies or institutions must generate feedback mechanisms that create inertia 
or possible returns in order to avoid the emergence of rival policy ideas or new sets of 
interest. 
e) Once the trajectory has been established, this same trajectory will tend to 
generate an inertia whereby established individual and cultural interests will have a high 
opportunity cost when it comes to changing the system. 
f) Finally, there will be a mechanism that allows for changes in the system of 
path-dependence, changes which are located in the interaction of cultural spheres, 
structural elements and human activity. 
 
The analytical structure may be explained graphically as follows, in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Analytical structure of path dependence 
 
Background 








that define the 
viable options and 
mould the selection 
processes 















The solution of 
conflicts generated 
by reactions and 
counter-reactions 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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The main objectives of CFP, which officially came into being in 1983, were as follows: to 
prevent overfishing, to guarantee that fishermen had the means of production that were both 
permanent and lasting; to provide a regular supply to consumers and those involved in 
processing such that both volume and price remain relatively constant; to improve conservation 
and the management of resources; and to ensure balanced territorial development.  
After the initial postulates, CFP underwent two reforms in 1992 and 2002. The former was 
characterized by an attempt to better harmonize fishing fleets and stock management; by the 
actions and measures that tended to reduce the number of vessels; and by the instruments that 
facilitated the financial aid to attenuate the social consequences of the adjustments 
paralysations of fleets. The main axes of the first reform were the progressive implantation of 
fishing licenses among producers in order to reduce overfishing.   
The second reform is consistent with the first. The measures aimed at tackling overcapacity 
are now the main concern of the second reform and, as a result, the concept of “fishing effort” is 
applied in reaction to and as a response to the constant decline in stocks and biomass. The 
instruments used in order to do this were; the generalized establishment of the TAC, according 
to species and fishing areas; the reinforcement of controls, the provision of aid to restructure the 
fleet, and a firm commitment to radically reduce the capacity of the fleet. 
The results of these decisions meant that public aid for the construction of vessels was now 
subject to control, a dynamic which is clearly expressed in the recent European Court of 
Auditors’ report (2011). Further, aid aimed at modernization was only authorized when this did 
not involve an increase in fishing capacity. However, in spite of the reduction in the capacity of 
the fleet, levels of biomass and stocks and the health of these stocks are still below safety 
levels. 
The present discussions are intensifying scrutiny as to the judiciousness of the postulates 
and measures adopted right from the birth of the CFP. Warnings heavily underline the 
inadequacy of measures and actions to preserve, conserve and manage resources. What is 
also stressed is a lack of connection among the mechanisms that should have balanced and 
harmonized levels of fishing exploitation in line with rational tenets that aimed to address the 
competition and rivalry among fishermen and European States. There is, in effect, an historical 
vicious circle and a whole set of blatant contradictions and inconsistencies. There is not solution 
for the triangulation of the problems: biological, environmental, and those related to ecosystems; 
economic and financial; and finally, social problems in terms of participation and responsibility.  
In short, the same objectives are mooted, while scarcely taking into account far reaching 
changes and transformations. Further, the specifics, as stipulated in the new reform, are 
beginning to fall by the wayside as those involved argue that said commitments require 
additional time. This means that the period of implantation needs to be longer. For example: a) 
the definition of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) for all of the species after 2015; b) the total 
prohibition of discards after 2015; c) limiting transferable quotas, until a more suitable juncture; 
d) the establishment of multi-annual recovery plans for fish stocks; e) the adaptation of 
governance my means of increased regionalization in a future reform; f) or the harmonizing of 
F. Martín Palmero and F. González Laxe / European Journal of Government and Economics 7(2), 138-153. 
146  
international stances with respect to fishing activity whenever possible. Various researchers 
have been confirming the failures and mistakes inherent in the CFP for some time (Khalilian et 
al., 2010, González-Laxe, 2010). The question arises whether the new reforms should give 
preference and reinforce preceding measures, in the hope that they turn out to be more 
efficient; or, in contrast, try and learn from what happened in the past, thus facilitating the 
emergence of new actors and the assimilation of new types of innovative instruments and tools. 
Table 2 shows the different positions in order to help to understand these controversies.  
 
 
Table 2. Synopsys of the negotiation of the CFP reform 
SUBJECT Initial EC Proposal Agreements and Disagreements 
SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT 
 












Aims to ensure that, by 2015, all 
stocks are being exploited in a 
sustainable way via the 
application of fishing quotas and 
a measure of Maximum 
Sustainable Yield. 
 
The eco-systemic approach will 
apply to the multi-annual plans 
with the aim of taking into 
account the links between fishing 
and eco-systems. 
 
Mono-specific fishing plans 
should be replaced by plans 
based on fisheries. 
 
More flexible. In 2015 if possible. 






Current plans are not based on 
this principle due to the difficulty 
of creating and implementing 
highly reliable mechanisms. 
 
 
Failure of the attempt to 
substitute the TAC mechanism 
and quotas with a system based 
on fishing effort. No deadlines or 
time limits are established and 
there are no new specific 
administrative measures. 
DISCARDS There is a commitment to 
eliminate all discards from 2016 
onwards. 
The date has been moved back 
and 5% of total captures may still 
be rejected. The closest to a total 
discard will be in 2019. 
RELATIVE  
STABILITY 
The key to the distribution of 
quotas by fishing area according 
to country is not subject to 
discussion by Member States. 
Relative stability is non-
negotiable. Hence, there 
continues to be historical 
discrimination with respect to 
certain fleets. 
FISHING CONSESSIONS From 2014 onwards there will be 
a new system for the concession 
of fishing rights for vessels of 
over 12 metres in length. This will 
be mandatory with the aim of 
adjusting fleet capacity to 
resources. An attempt to boost 
the economic viability of vessels. 
The introduction of individual 
concessions of transferable 
fishing quotas will be voluntary 
and will be established by each 
Member State and limited for 
each of them. The fleet 
adjustment programmes will 
continue, but without public aid. 
EUROPEAN FISHERIES FUND  There will be a new European 
fund for the fishing sector that will 
take in the period 2014-2020. 
There is a demand for greater 
clarification of contents and 
powers. 
ILLEGAL FISHING Attempts to prevent the rise of a 
parallel market. A profound 
reform of the control and 
execution system will be 
requested so that measures are 
applied uniformly throughout the 
EU. The remit of the European 
Fisheries Control Agency will be 
broadened. 
All countries are in agreement. 
However, the legislation is 
different with respect to sanctions 
and fines. 
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SUBJECT Initial EC Proposal Agreements and Disagreements 
EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF 
FISHING  
Bilateral fishing agreements are 
being ignored since they are 
considered to be too expensive. 
It must be a priority and should 
manifest itself in the defence of 
the fishing company in all 
international fishing organisms 
and institutions and with respect 
to all bilateral agreements. 
PUBLIC AID There is a move towards a 
reduction in public aid and 
subsidies.  
Aid for scrapping vessels and for 
temporary stoppages is intended 
to continue. 
ARTISANAL FISHING Not contemplated as a separate 
branch of the industry. 
There is a demand for a 
differentiated system since 
artisanal fishing and shellfishing 
are 2 singular types of fishing, 
and are specific to specific 
territories. 
COMMON ORGANIZATION OF 
MARKETS 
They maintain the classical 
structure derived from the time 
when CFP came into existence 
and based on formulas 
established in the 1980’s.  
There is a demand for better 
market information and norms 
that establish “fair trade”. 
Moreover these should be 
accompanied by a more 
transparent and competitive 
international framework which 
incorporates a greater level of 
equality and transparency with 
respect to the interchange of 
products imported and exported. 
PARTICIPATION AND 
REGIONALISM 
The commission wants to 
maintain its power in the decision 
making process that affects the 
CFP. So the Regional Advisory 
Councils (RAC) will be able to 
elevate their opinions to the 
Commission but without these 
being binding. The aim, 
therefore, is to increase the 
degree of compliance and that 
the RAC promotes dialogue 
among the interested parties. 
The resolutions must be in 
consonance with the instruments 
of governance, with a bottom-up 
approach and there must be a 
consensus among the agents. 
The role of the RAC must be 
strengthened and this aspect is 
only guaranteed if there are 
ample financial resources and if 
the resolution proposals emitted 
by the RAC are backed. 
Source, Own elaboration 
 
An initial impression suggests that the thesis and general principles underlying path- 
dependence are perfectly apt for explaining the history and workings of the CFP. In short, there 
is great resistance to change; forms are always the same; there is a high degree of inertia and a 
considerable weight of historical and cultural conditions, as well as an administration that 
reinforces specific and private interests. 
 
4. Analysis of institutional and contractual factors 
 
The three main actors involved in fishing reforms (producers, institutions and researchers) have 
highlighted an opportunity to clearly set out what fishing activity involves and to formulate new 
adjustment and sustainability proposals. Further, they have underlined that there are other 
external factors that might significantly influence the evolution of stocks. These include, climate 
change, the warming of the seas, the new distribution of species, pollution, etc. 
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Table 3. Behavioural code according to objectives  
 Institutional Level Scientific Area Sectoral Plan 
Resource 
Management 
Positive evaluation with 
respect to the recuperation of 
stocks, 
And positive expectations with 
regard to the future. 
The adoption of planning and 
management measures, but, 
with a delay and inconstancy 
in their implementation. 
The delays in remedying 
the imbalances are 
criticised. Scientists state 
that the institutions 
charged with applying the 
measures do not follow 
their recommendations.  
They usually demand 
more specifics when it 
comes to defining the 
planning measures. 
Highly critical of 
decisions. Besides 
taking into consideration 
environmental factors, 
the reform should also 
consider social and 
economic conditions; 
that is, how employment 







goals (7 years),  
A grace period for 
harmonization planning among 
Member States, with respect 
to the method for assigning 
fishing options.  
The debate on planning 
mechanisms remains open: 
specifically, with respect to 
MSY and the precautionary 
principle. 
Certain scepticism. 
The application of 
measures depends upon 
the role assigned to 
scientific opinion 
(executive competence or 
consultation); and on 
budgets for their 
subsequent application. 
Very critical. Elements 
of uncertainty should be 
taken into account such 
as those relative to the 
size and productivity of 
populations, reference 
levels and the 
distribution of mortality 
among other indices. 
Discards Acceptance of the objective, 
but not its immediate 
application. 
In favour of its immediate 
implementation. They talk 
of its necessity 
Immediate 
implementation is not 
possible. It is argued 
that scientists are out of 
touch with the 
underlying reality of 
fishing and underline 






Favourable, but conscious of 
the difficulty and complexity of 
their distribution 
Favourable, but 
conscious of the need to 
implant them in line with 
the needs of the  fishery 
It’s necessary to 
distinguish between 




Emphasises its relevance and 
are aware of its role. 
Imprecision of definitions. 
They believe it is 
fundamental 
Boosting artisanal 
fishing is essential. Aid 
and support, whether 
this be via 
compensation or price 
controls 
Sustainability Feasible Commitment Rigorous control Mandatory Reference  
Regionalization Listed as a high institutional 
cost. Difficulties with a 
definition and derived policies: 
renationalization and 
decentralization 
 They emphasise the 
need to clearly define 
what the “conditional 
transfers” are in each 
area or fishery. 
International 
Dimension  
Defined as a highly important 
objective. However, budget 
restrictions are the reason why 
fishing agreements have not 
been renewed. Disparity of 
criteria among Member States 
Plausible Objective They underline its 
importance and that it 
requires greater 
institutional commitment 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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In the same line, it has been stated that since the origin of the CFP there have been many 
changes. In resume, the process has not been a total failure; there has been a certain progress  
to the extent that various Member States organize the management of shared resources 
together by following a decision making process which, in the main, is characterised by a 
qualified majority. 
In the light of these considerations, it is easy to see that European Council constantly gives 
in to pressure from the productive sector and regularly fails to follow the recommendations of 
scientists (Villasante et al., 2011). This is normally justified by arguing that, on analyzing the 
evolution of stocks, it is interpreted that the objective of the CFP-2002 is not to achieve an MSY, 
but rather to guarantee levels of stocks within reasonable biological limits and with sustainable 
exploitation (article 3, Regulation 2371/2002). Therefore, not having achieved the objectives 
cannot be a reason of reproval. 
As a consequence, it is possible to present an analysis of the economic motives derived 
from the behaviour of the actors. That is, a theoretical-practical description in the form of a code 
with economic pretentions. 
This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the different actors’ positions. Any 
attempt to include all casuistic reasoning or relevant specifics would be overwhelmed by a 
surfeit of information. The exercise we are carrying out is merely to illustrate the different 
stances (in some cases entailing permanent conflict) among the various perspectives. Thus, the 
analysis includes both features directly connected to tradable and non-tradale issues, in order to 
contextualize and broaden the possible spill-over effects of the crisis. Finally, the conflicts and 
disputes between compensatory and competitive policies and actions are highlighted. 
In short, we conclude that there are no restrictive variables or variables which are, a priori, 
more important than others; rather they are based upon the combined behaviour of a large 
number of agents. Secondly, there is no obsession to achieve any kind of balance. Third, the 
short-term objectives are constantly changing due to the heterogeneity of the agents and their 
own particular circumstances. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Regulatory fishing policy has gained great importance in recent decades (Arnason, 2001, Clark, 
2006, Carciofi & Azqueta, 2012) and the European Union has been involved in much of it. The 
reason for the new push is that stocks have been placed under intense pressure. The main 
reasons for this are the oversized world fleet and, by extension, excess capacity, the fact that 
the technology for detecting and capturing resources evolves very quickly and exerts strong 
pressure on captures, and finally, the difficulty to obtain planning or management instruments 
sufficient to guarantee that objectives are reached, that stocks are re-built and there will be 
profitability for producers in the very near future. The actions carried out are interdisciplinary in 
nature and this tends to magnify complexity while offering different partial and independent 
F. Martín Palmero and F. González Laxe / European Journal of Government and Economics 7(2), 138-153. 
150  
solutions.  
Fisheries are controlled by situations where human interactions are combined, where 
fishermen follow and keep a group of rules in order to be able to coordinate their interactions 
with the others. This group of rules allow to restrict decisions and also to give form to individual 
preferences. In this sense, fishermen follow very specific patterns:  
 
a) The agents (fishermen) can take into account the consequences of their 
decisions according to their individual preferences, affecting both themselves and those 
with whom they interact;  
b) The agents (fishermen) are adaptive, that is, they follow the established rules. 
This means they can reduce those costs derived from limitations; and 
c) The agents (fishermen) behave according to the context; they can determine if 
this context is appropriate or not, bringing about an information process and generating 
incentives in the decision-making.  
 
In short, friction is transmitted by various basic channels. The first of these resides in the role 
of national interest and how that of one country or a group of countries clashes with the needs 
and perspectives of the rest. This prevents from updating the map of those regions which are 
highly dependent on fishing since this involves overlaying different kinds of plans and maps. 
The first layer includes spatial or territorial maps; specific and segmented maps according to 
fleet and also depending on the final markets where the product is eventually delivered. 
The second layer of mapping refers to the relative balance between the changing potential in 
the volume of captures and fleet capacity. In this regard, the tried processes of restructuring and 
modernization become to be highly relevant in terms of economic aid and a commitment to 
create mixed or joint-venture firms. 
The third set of plans includes the dynamics inherent in the process of liberalization taking 
place on the demand side of fishing markets; these affect the reductions in tariffs, 
contingencies, health conditions, labelling and the normalization of products, as well as the 
concept of responsible fishing.  
The fourth facet of the composite route map deals with adjusting the planning models to the 
reality of fishing. In this respect, there is a need to establish whether or not the fishery in 
question is multi-species and if the scenario is one in which vessels are capturing one particular 
species rather than several. 
Fifth and finally, competition within some elements of the fleet impedes sustainable growth 
because there emerge distorting factors and variables, such as the concept of relative stability, 
and the dynamics of market liberalization which thwart, hinder and limit the development and 
potential benefits that inputs might derive. Likewise, fisheries sector presents negative 
externalities coming from the no-consideration of the effects originated by the other fishermen 
and their own effects on fishing reserves.  
These externalities appear when these two conditions are met: a) fishing activity of an agent 
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(producer) causes the other producers to lose their well-being; and b) this loss of well-being is 
not compensated.  
The externalities in the fisheries sector are a consequence of market failures and this brings 
about serious consequences as regards fishing management policies. Hence, there is a 
significant discrepancy between short-term and long-term objectives. If there are no incentives 
so that preservation effects can be taken into account, the short-term objectives of fishermen 
can prevail over long-term objectives. This derives in the so-called “social trick” (Seijo et al. 
1997), where market mechanisms are not able to achieve the optimum by themselves, but they 
give rise to the over-investment and over-exploitation of resources.  
To sum up, in view of these divergences, it may be observed that the European Parliament 
and Commission are unwilling to renounce immediate or short-term objectives. Also, the Council 
search for greater flexibility in the conceptual framework of the new CFP. 
The CFP is a wonderful source for analysing the path-dependence as it allows us to 
compare public and private efficacies, as well as the stable and new implemented actions and 
the framework of reference. In this case, we confirm that North’s thesis (1990) was right when 
defending that these actions and frameworks of reference were unstable.   
In this line, the study and analysis focusing on organizations and on institutional changes 
and transfers have become a broad field of research used evermore frequently by economists. 
Not only are institutional efficiencies highlighted, and these exist at every level of the decision 
making process, but also they can be persistent. This leads to great inertia, mainly because of 
the innate limitations of human beings to reorganize themselves more flexibly and to be more 
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